JULES

0’ - Ten years ago, 195 countries negotiated the Paris Agreement, a landmark deal under which nations agreed to limit global warming to well below 2 degrees. But ten years on, this spirit of global cooperation seems long gone, and it's been replaced not just with trade wars, but with actual wars, often with energy and climate stakes as a background to these crises. And while Europe's taken an early leadership in climate policy, we've really struggled to turn this into industrial success.

So Europe stands once again at a crossroads: will we achieve clean industrial leadership, or will we face what former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi calls a slow agony? On this show, we meet the innovators, the investors, and the policymakers who are building Europe's industrial future, and uncover what it will take to get there.

I'm Jules Besnainou, and you're listening to Time to Scale, a podcast by Cleantech for Europe.

PART 1

JULES

0’55 - Today, as we approach the 10th anniversary of the Paris Agreement, we are incredibly honored to host Laurence Tubiana, the architect behind this landmark agreement and one of the leading figures of climate policy in Europe.

Hello, Laurence. (Bonjour).

Laurence, you are an economist and a diplomat, and you lead the European Climate Foundation, a philanthropic organization driving Europe's transition. You're also the envoy to Europe for COP31, taking place this year in Belém. Thank you so much for making the time to be with us today. And if you agree, I'd like to focus today's conversation really on the role that public policy can play to help Europe reach a dual climate and industrial leadership. But before we dive into this topic, our audience knows you very well as a leading voice for climate policy, but might not know you that well personally. So could you tell us a bit about your personal journey? What led you to where you are today?

LAURENCE TUBIANA

01’47 - First, thank you for this opportunity to connect with a very, very important network. And I'm very happy to have this opportunity. It's long ago. It's almost 30 years. You know, I fell into climate policy and diplomacy and activism. And why? Because when you start, you can't stop. And you can't stop because it's just a massive problem. Of course, we are so running late to tackle it, really. And at the same time, it's an incredible mix of, you know, intellectual, technical, economical, and political elements, and geographical, and sovereignty, so everything in one place, if I may say so. So from an academic and a professor as I am, finally, at the end of the day, it's just fascinating. So there are many reasons for the importance of the issue, but at least a fascination. And then, I see everybody who starts talking or working on climate never stops. So it was a long journey. Again, I didn't start by climate, by the way. I was, of course, as a university professor and a researcher more in international economy. And I started by forest and biodiversity mainly because, of course, of my agriculture economy's background. And, of course, climate now has come as a central element. In particular, when I arrived at the cabinet as an advisor of the, at that time, prime minister in the 1970s. And the idea that finally France was totally unequipped compared to other major countries like U.S., for example, or even U .K. And that France diplomacy, France, you know, didn't connect the scientists we had, which are excellent in climate policy, in particular in climate science, and the reality of how we have to defend these ideas at global level. So it took me the opportunity to create many institutions, the reform of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, creating a job for a climate ambassador or an environment ambassador. So things we didn't have where many other countries, even smaller than ourselves, has had. And so it was really an interesting moment through academia, government, politics, and then back to activism and NGOs.

JULES

04’13 - Over these 30 years, how do you see the climate conversation or climate activism? How has it evolved over this time?

LAURENCE TUBIANA

04’19 - It has evolved enormously, first because it was very a niche discussion. I remember when we went in Kyoto in 1997 or even 1992 when the convention was started, really very few people attended, very few press. And now you have COPs where you have sometimes 100,000 people, which in a way is probably a little bit too many. But so it was really something that only scientists and NGOs and environmental NGOs were taking care. The head of governments, the head of states, didn't get it. They didn't understand the science. I remember many conversations with Tony Blair or Gordon Brown and others, who were the first ones in Europe just to tackle this issue seriously. But still for them it was sort of a moral issue, a scientific issue. they didn't know how to grapple with. And so I saw the qualification of everybody, the media, of course the government, the industry of course, the economic actors, including now later on, it took time, the financial actors, whether private or public. This really went after Paris, but before Paris it was more, again, science first, NGOs and environmental movement, and slowly, slowly, administration that came in. And then for a sudden, the perception of the risks that has changed to lead the conversation. So the movement was in this direction. And then by Glasgow and, so 2021, I think everybody was concerned by what can happen in its own sphere of activity and action. And so from an issue, it began a global conversation. And that was really very interesting to see.

JULES

06’14 - That's super interesting. I'm going a bit towards the clean tech space, but curious to hear in these very beginnings, were there discussions about kind of new technologies or how we could replace kind of fossil fuels?

LAURENCE TUBIANA

06’25 - So the origin of emission was clear from the start. Again, 1997, the renewable energy place was very, very limited. Most government thought that, or most economic actors thought, it could only provide for a small part because of grid, because of everything. So it took time that the cleantech became really a solution. And many times when I was preparing for the Paris negotiation, I was telling, you know, the climate risks are now much more measurable and present. It's not just only the future, but the solution out there. And it was the first time you can put the number there, the cost of solar panels. At that moment, of course, it was mostly the renewable energy system that began to be competitive. It was not still there in '24, the COP21. But then what was really interesting to see is that immediately after Paris, and in a way it was an intended impact we were looking for, but it has been an explosion on clean tech.

On the 12th of December of 2015, I would not imagine that the electric vehicle industry would make such a rapid increase. They were there already, but just an explosion, no. That batteries would cost half of what they were costing at that time. So I think Paris has given the signal, and that was what we were looking for. You know, when I began to prepare the negotiation, I remember it was even May 2015, and I was thinking, "What is the message I want to be publishing to the press on the 12th or the 13th?" And the message was, "This is inevitable. We are going there." Because you have to convince people that the choice is there. So it just -- basically, when you are an economist, you know that expectation makes this whole, that to shape expectation because you can't force people to do things. You have to make their future vision change, their interest vision change, which is really behind the philosophy of the Paris Agreement. It's not always easy because, of course, we have adversaries, we have enemies, we have the fossil fuel sector who want to change the perception, and that's the battle of today. I'm sure we'll talk about that later. So that was basically the way I saw the cleantech exploding after Paris because then the expectation shaping was clearly there. And then it has only increased from there.

JULES

09’02 - Absolutely. And I have a bit of the reverse view because obviously I come from the clean tech space. I started in the early 2010s. And so we started to see companies like Tesla at the time starting, and it felt like a bit of a pipe dream, right? But then I remember where I was on December 12th, you know, 2015. And remembering that, you know, that feeling of like, actually, there's now such kind of consensus behind the policy that of course this is going to drive demand of course this is going to mean very different markets right but at the time it was already it was a vibrant technological space but we hadn't really connected it to how policy can enable demand.

LAURENCE TUBIANA

09’39 - Exactly, the rest of the economy globally at the same time in each geography and globally and now of course sometime I'm really frustrated with that's happening too slowly and we are running anyway we were already in 2015 running against time. And we have not won that battle by far. But at that time, and when I look back, it has really put a line in the sand. There is nothing compared before Paris and after. At least I can be, in a way, rewarded for that. But you see, we are really running late. And the obstacle in the battle, even now when I see so much pressure from the U.S. administration, for example, to say we have to go back to an economy organized around fossil fuel, like 19th century economy. So, you know, this is, it cannot be a linear progress. In a way, the technology has finally not a linear, but really a rapid growth, but the political economy is not linear. So we have to combine this immense progress in technology and the fact that on the policy, political level, and financial level, we are fighting all the time. And that's why we have a lot of highs and a lot of lows. And certainly these days, we are in a low moment.

JULES

10’50 - So we'll dive into a bit more detail on what needs to be done on the policy side. But maybe first, you've referenced the spirit of Paris. Can you elaborate a bit on this? What is the spirit of Paris? And do you feel like we still have it?

LAURENCE TUBIANA

11’03 - You know, it came out of a lot of mistakes and failures. We started in 1992, then 1997, and then you see U.S. out of the Kyoto Protocol, and everybody living, and EU alone, together with Russia, just to get the entrance to WTO somehow. Ad then you see that this spirit was made out the perception of again of the risk and the failures of the old way to work. In my view, when I was in Copenhagen in 2009, I was leading the French delegation at that time and you know, it was interesting to see that we were still in the old model that the big elephant can decide for everybody. And it failed. And so preparing Paris, it was very evident we should not fall in the same trap. So we have really to say how we can generate a consensus of something that if you have only a discussion between China and U.S., you will have always a very low as a bar because they don't want competition between them on that. But if you bring the small islands and the science and everybody and the local authorities and the mayors, then you have a total different conversation. And the spirit of Paris was we cannot solve and in a way shape this mindset if we don't have all the voices because that's where the balance of power change. It is a balance of power problem. Again the big elephant, the big sector are there, but you have to show them or to put them in challenge by the others who doesn't have the same interest. And you know, it was very interesting in Paris that the small islands, it just doesn't count economically point of view. They are just minuscule territories, very few people. And their voice was super important for the result. So their impact was absolutely incommensurable compared to their economic power, which is normally in international relation theory, that shouldn't work. No, you know, the small doesn't have a voice. But in this case, and because the way we shaped the negotiation, they finally had a major voice. And I am just writing all this in a book that will be published in October. So you will see all the details.

JULES

13’33 - For sure. And it almost feels quaint, right? What you say of like smaller economic powers having that voice at the table when we see what's happening today in the world. So how do we muster that spirit again?

LAURENCE TUBIANA

13’44 - So we are, of course, faced with a big challenge that there is the deal of the violent geopolitics sort of behavior is back. But at the same time, if I may say so, in a moment where the American hegemony is really in crisis. So it's like the last efforts to keep going, where in finally on the technology future, on the vision of the world, I think they are totally, well, it's a mistake of understanding. And so you can't do that through military and you know, trade pressure only. Okay, it can work a little bit, but it will disappear, or at least it will be fight back. And you see the Beijing summit these days was an extraordinary demonstration that the U.S. cannot lead anymore, and it has major, major opponents to decide what’s the future. And that's why it comes to the Europe role. Now, we are in a world where we have to make choices, and to build on or back to Paris spirit, We have to convince this emerging power that this is the best solution for them and that they have for many reasons just to be as inclusive as it was in Paris. But what do we do with U.S. is a question.

PART 2

JULES

15’12 - So, let's now turn to your current role. For those who may not know it well, what is the European Climate Foundation? And maybe more importantly, what's really your theory of change that guides the work there?

LAURENCE TUBIANA

15’24 - Well, European Climate Foundation has one very simple mission, which is to put climate everywhere we can, in the political agenda, in the policy agenda, in the people's mind, whatever it is, but they have to think climate. And so this can take many, many different forms. But what we have to witness now is that for reasons which we cannot control, climate has become to be very, very political and polarized, which was not the case before. In Paris, you could face, of course, interests that were saying climate doesn't exist, but it was less and less so, meaning there was no really a big opinion survey that would say, oh, no, climate change is an ox. That was, of course, Donald Trump's first mandate theory. But now it's different. It's very polarized, so we have to understand that climate policy, we have to be careful that climate policy, clean technology is not captured by this division of the world that the fossil fuel economy finally was better for poor people, which is of course not true, but you know how disinformation and propaganda work these days. So that's I think the problem we are facing, and that's why in ECF now the problem, the serial change, you have to encompass not only the technical element, how to promote the scientific-based decision-making, evidence-based decision-making for policymakers at national level, Brussels level, and local level, and international, of course. But as well, just understand that we have to look at the culture battle we are faced, not because we choose to be in there, and of course the politics, which of course are, and the financial. So we have to go in every front, and that has defined the mandate. And of course, security, competitiveness of the economy, because we have to make the case for the economic opportunities. And at the same time, the season values and the values is to protect not only the generation of today, but the future, meaning our children's future.

JULES

17’34 - I see a bit two different areas of discourse, right? There's the discourse to top policymakers, who I feel are very receptive to these ideas of competitiveness, security, decarbonization, etc, etc. But you've also been very involved in citizens' assemblies and other ways to involve the broader public in this discourse. And I feel like there, if we eventually want to convince voters, these concepts of sovereignty, security, decarbonization, they don't necessarily translate well to day-to-day life. So I'm keen to hear from you, what's been your experience in the Citizens Assembly? And how do we translate all these discourse so that voters can understand the value proposition?

LAURENCE TUBIANA

18’24 - Maybe I would put a nuance of your judgment that the policymakers understand.

JULES

Okay.

LAURENCE TUBIANA

18’30 - They don't understand. They are not stupid, at least hopefully not all of them. But even the famous phrase that sometimes people see, you know, complotism and manipulation where there is only stupidity, which happens. I can testify. But I think the problem is today that because of this polarization, the policy makers are afraid of that. Not they don't care for, but they are not, I think they are not leading. And that's why I think there is a citizen and there is a voter. And sometimes it's not exactly the same, no? Because you are a citizen when in a way you sit in a place where you have time to think and to reflect and make decision or organize. And there is a beautiful phrase from a famous now, of course, deceased American philosopher, John Dewey. And he said, you know, the public is not the opinion. It's when people gather together vis-a-vis a problem they are faced with and that concerns them and try to organize with others to face this problem. And climate is exactly in that context. And so I see a distance and even a contradiction between the way the policy makers are, in a way, identifying where their interest is, which is the voters' interest that can be, makes them re-elected in our democracies, and the perception of the public. Every survey we do, our ECF or others, in Europe, but at global level, that at least 60% of people are concerned, and that these numbers go higher when it depends on the countries to 79% in some European countries, that really it's a concern. They would like government to be more active and that there is a disconnect in a way now. And why is this so? Because, you know, when you are in a difficult political moment and slow growth since COVID and then insecurity because of the invasion of Ukraine and now the Gaza war, you see you listen to the organized interest much more easily. You know, it's easier for the CEO of a big oil company to go in the president's office. And I'm sure on clean tech you know. The door is not that open because you see what are your importance, no? How much is your weight in terms of influence? And that's what is happening now.

So I would say a disconnect. Citizen assembly, to go short, was an extraordinary experience because you see when people arrive, these 150 people, they have heard about climate change. It was after the Yellow Vest Movement in France. And they were very, in a way, in a distrustful mode. They were saying, oh, the government want to manipulate us. And it was not what it could have been. But then they sit down and they had experts talking to them and they have time. It took almost one year because of COVID. They worked like mad in weekends and at night with webinars. And they came with a very, very strong catalog of measures that were much ahead of the government decision. And then the government was afraid. They began to panic. Like, for example, not allow publicity advertisement that go for the SUV. And then that was just a shock. Or block the flights where you can find, well, for three hours travel in front. Again, just panic. So it was really the demonstration that when you reasonable people who came from any, you know, a nurse, a former firefighter, they sit down, they are normal people, even they were right-wing or left-wing, sometimes were in the yellow vest movement themselves. And they say, look, if we consider the problem, this is the solution we propose. And so I see, unfortunately, because it's not an easy way and we need speedy decision making, but now we need the citizen to take really, to give them space to make the policymakers come back to reasonable. And Draghi would be more listened to if we have more voice of citizen. At least that's my analysis today.

JULES

22’58 - And so just ideas, like how do we take this experiment to scale with a population of tens of millions of people?

LAURENCE TUBIANA

23’06 - I think, one, the old experience we had by ECF has supported many of them. And, you know, always, always with positive outcomes. One example in Krakow in Poland. And, you know, Poland is a country where coal is very important. And the people in Krakow decided very strong measures against air pollution. And even car, you know, the difficulty we have in France, for example, that we don't want to protect the center of cities from polluting cars. They accepted that. They decided for that. And because it was a citizen assembly doing that, it was really well accepted where a top-down decision doesn't work. So how we do that, local level, evidently. But now for this to operate, then the government has to be trustful to the result, not just say, not just ignore the parliament, of course not, but really take people into account. And that's not happening for the moment.

JULES

Fair enough.

PART 3

JULES

24’10 - So, Laurence, let's get to the main topic of our discussion today, which is really the role that public policy can play to help Europe reach this dual, we say dual climate and industrial leadership. Maybe we'll get to define that a bit more. But first, let me try to sum up what I believe the current situation is, and you tell me if you agree with this assessment. I would say Europe is really excellent at innovating in clean technologies. We're great at developing new technologies. We have a great research ecosystem, et cetera, et cetera. Our main struggle is really when we need to scale or industrialize these technologies. That's where typically Europe fails for a variety of reasons on fragmented markets, lack of investment, et cetera, et cetera. And then in addition to that, for larger industries that are already mature, they face a bit of a deadly combo of high energy prices, overcapacity from China, and large investments needed to do the transition. And obviously, we're sitting here in early September, so that's at least kind of what I feel the view is right now. Do you agree with this assessment broadly, or do you have anything to add?

LAURENCE TUBIANA

25’15 - No, totally. It's even just such a contradiction that all innovations are finally bought by others and developed by others. And the good thing is I think now there is this recognition that that should be the case. So I will take the problem in two sides. on the cleantech side, which in a way we have some innovation or many innovation. And then there is, as you mentioned, even in the cleantech sectors where are more mature, and because of the enormous Chinese capacities that have been developed through 15 years now, we are at a difficult moment where-- and it's not easy to respond to that question: How much we can still be competitive in the future? What kind of technological breakthrough we have to make? Just take the automotive sector. Really, I don't know. I see everybody's focus on the integration of artificial intelligence in this sector. Is this the right way to go? I suppose, anyway, the Chinese are going faster and faster because of their competitive system inside. And I'm not-- so we have to make choices. And it's, of course, a very difficult judgment. I would say-- and I was not thinking of that, but just before-- but because of what you are saying. We should not see clean tech in isolation with society. And maybe, again, because if I take the automotive sector, I don't know how we can win. And it's evident that for many reasons, the traditional automotive sector in Europe has been ambivalent. Not totally against electrification, but yes, no. And take BMW, Volkswagen, or no others, they have developed that, but not so much because they hopefully or they thought that they will forever have this brand premium. And it's of course disappearing now. So to run in the same category or the same goods, maybe not the absolute solution. Again, if I take-- again, thinking with you, how we could have our European society, who are under pressure, what kind of goods that could fit with the society, with-- you think small vehicle, big vehicles, huh? Should we really-- and of course, all the automotive sector has piled on enormous cars even you can't put them in your garage because they are too small. Can't we say clean tech plus new values or new culture that then you can combine your innovation with a demand that is not already captured by any way the enormous advance of China? So that's one aspect. And I would love to develop that idea with you, with your network, because I think we are not exploring that. What are the products and the clean tech that would fit more, not only with today's values, but the projection of society in the future? And, you know, we are still in democratic societies. We are still wanting justice and fairness in our societies. We would like, and maybe that, again, that the discussion I, in a way, I'm responding to your previous question. That was finally the citizen assembly question, you know, how you have cheap electric vehicle, I mean, access to. And maybe it's a small vehicle. That's not a big one. So anyway, so one element is linking societal demands with a clean tech.

JULES

29’02 - And maybe to interrupt you here, I feel like that's what's happening in solar at the moment, where you're starting to have super cheap solar panels that people can install even without an installer, right? They can put it on their garden or on their balcony. It costs, you know, 500, 600 euros a pack. They plug it in directly. And it instantly meets this demand for cheaper energy, but also some kind of, you know, resilience and autonomy. Right. So you see these things happening. Right. But clearly in EVs in Europe at the moment, we don't really have this kind of product market fit.

LAURENCE TUBIANA

29’36 - And so maybe that's something interesting to see. We will not compete on, you know, on the traditional what is now the dominant market power. But what is alternative routes? On the -- so investment, evidently, and that's why I think the Draghi and Enrico Letta report where we have to implement them, that if we don't have capital market, a unified capital market, and if we don't have all these problems of regulation between the different nation-states in Europe, we would difficultly have the market -- the size of the market necessary. And so, probably that's the condition. The second part is which, in a way, sometimes we have a vision of the connection between public and private investment and how they go together. Of course, public procurement is certainly a very good way to go. That's something ECF is really working hard because you have to create that demand on on steel, on buildings, on whatever, anything, the recycling element, all the things. So I think we should have, and that of course is a particular moment, and I hope your network will be very vocal, that the public procurement should have elements in there that are in a way allowing the demand for innovation or European innovation really recognized. And you know the devil is in the details, So it's not only local procurement, but it is as well. So something maybe we have to think about that. So investment. Then the electricity price. If you don't have cheap, clean electrons, you will not have a clean industry. But at the same time, I feel that because of the deployment of AI or AI of the demand, the idea we need energy at any cost. We are missing totally what was a very, very strong strength of European industry, which was energy efficiency. And we could have another news there to say, look, we have to be the best one at what level is not happening. And we see every time we have target on energy efficiency, they are not met. And that could be a very big challenge as an opportunity to say, you know, the world is like this, electricity is high. How do we get clean electrons, but we get a really strong energy efficiency?

JULES

32’11 - How do you explain that? I see the same thing you do, right? These targets are never met. Is it because you don't see energy that's saved? What makes this harder to achieve?

LAURENCE TUBIANA

32’21 - I think because it's not politically interesting and shiny. I remember Tony Blair, of course, he was not prime minister ever, even at that moment. and then he was looking for a global role. And we tried with some NGOs and environmental organizations to convince him that he could be the champion for energy efficiency. And he looked at us and said, "How I can shine with that?" No, we can't shine. And so I think we have to find a way, the culture of it, and it would be an interesting citizen culture to say, "Look, why spend so much? "How I can be more efficient? How can have more autonomy?” But that's a culture battle, because again, you see any policy makers, they would never talk about that. Or it is at the end of the speech, no? And nobody cares. And so I think this, because you look at China, for example, and they are concerned about that. For example, as a good sort of story, they put all the data mining for crypto outside China, because it's too much energy. So they are concerned, but they have not a policy of energy efficiency that is really as strong as their investment in research and innovation on developing more products and more things. And I think this relation with clean tech and AI should be very interesting because now for the moment, it's increased demand of energy without caring what's the source of it, mostly. And that's interesting that Google, I think, produce that they have more emission these years than they were before because they don't - whatever energy is good. So I think that would be a fascinating thing.

JULES

34’09 - And it's going to start price competition. It's going to make it even more expensive. There's going to be competition on the use of energy. I mean, we already see industrial struggling.

LAURENCE TUBIANA

34’17 - It's energy and water. Just think about water would be really terrible problem that everybody wants to ignore. But you don't have data center. You don't have nuclear facilities, everything you need water, and water will be the scarce element. So whatever technology prevent water use would be good. So investment, absolutely. How we convince the - and I think we discussed previously in other meetings on the global investment program of EU and the way that the big elephants are always the same that are collecting the money, how we break that. We should -- I don't know. We should have a sort of very blunt assessment when not too late, particularly before MFF, etc, to say, look, this is a dead end. If we don't have this clean tech innovation sector receiving exactly the money we need, we will lose this competition. And that is not in the public eye. It's not in the policymakers. Because, of course, the other one have a direct access all the time. And because you are small, you don't have. So you have to ask for a place, like in the climate negotiation, where you have a voice. And, again, I have to think more about this.

JULES

35’41 - Well, you've been very vocal about the potential role of insurers in this transition. And, interestingly, so insurers have two businesses, right? On the one hand, they insure. But on the other, they invest the money that they take in, right? And what we see, at least on the cleantech side, is that their and other institutional investors are the same, right? Pension funds, banks. Their allocation, their financial allocation to early-stage technologies or to the scale-up of these technologies, like in the cleantech space but not only, are incredibly low in Europe, right? If you compare those to institutional investors in the U.S., there's typically 100x difference in their investment and their participation in, for instance, venture capital.

LAURENCE TUBIANA

36’23 - Very, very good thing. I didn't know that. I would be interested to work more on that. Yes, and that's why I think you need something because, of course, in Europe, the public element, the warranties for these early movers have to start. That could be a way to reassure the European insurers. But, you know, it's just crazy because last year the insurers at global level, the money they lost in the cost of the, well, they have to pay for the climate impact, was the equivalent of the benefit they got of their investment in fossil fuels. And it wouldn't only grow on the asymmetry. So I think it's really interesting to maybe to have a particular development of thinking on the combination of financial markets and clean tech involving them. And I think it's a very good idea to develop that. And again, it's a moment, Jules, to develop that through your network and to involve the key insurers because they have to shift their portfolio. And then, of course, they may not want to go alone, but they may want to go there together with public funding that could take part of the risk, which is what we try to do in many areas of climate finance. And that could be a joint demand from you and them, which I think we need. Better than what they ask for the regulation of the sector. Right. It could be more intelligent as a demand.

JULES

38’00 - Can I take you back to public procurement for a second and maybe linking that to the trade discussion that we started to have early on? You're starting to see a lot of calls to start to protect the European market and specific technologies and have pretty much local preference, right, in some areas like batteries and others where we are suffering from overcapacity in China. What's your view on these trade aspects and how do you link that to a more integrated kind of trade strategy for Europe?

LAURENCE TUBIANA

38’36 - The first element is we are in a trade war we haven't created. And this trade war is trying to twist our arm in Europe, but elsewhere as well, into going back to the fossil fuel and killing our renewable energy sector. That's very evident. It's now not an hidden project. It's just there on the table. So it means what? One is how we resist, which we are not totally doing. Second, where we find other friends than the U.S. who have decided that they want a Europe that is totally aligned with their own interests, with this crazy proposal of gas import, which is just ridiculous. How we do that? We have to recognize that we cannot do the transition without China for Europe. It may not be comfortable. But I think the Chinese, of course, need the Europe market. The other emerging markets are not at that level of absorption and, of course, price levels. It's difficult because geopolitics are not playing in this direction. We saw that recently in the Beijing meeting that Xi Jinping has gathered. And that's why for Europe it's really difficult. So I would say politically, centrally, I don't see a lot of capacity to do so. But what we could do is really focus on investment and private sector regulation of investment. So it has to work with China without having – we can't have a big political agreement to China now. When the Ukraine war is still there, we can't have it. So I think the only solution is – like for batteries, I understand that now we are looking for what is a right FDI framing for Chinese investment to make us benefit from their knowledge because they know better. There are some experience I think we should now formalize these these… so that's one. The second one is to look for how we can because China is China which is a big elephant we have to deal with but China the other countries are not necessarily wanting to do everything on Chinese framing.

And that's where we have to be innovative and to propose. I see, for example, the discussion between Europe and South Africa, some countries in Latin America, like Chile. Hopefully in Brazil, we will go there, we have trade, and it's recognize our co-dependence. And then we try to find the right balance of interest to, in a way, recognize that you have to keep value added in certain regions in exchange of critical material, for example, that's a classical example. And that's an innovative way of thinking of trade. And we have a long way to go. And an interesting thing is, I haven't listened to, but I would like, and I'm certainly in your network, you're thinking about how the clean tech can say, look, we need that trade policy to thrive. And that will be a very big conversation and very big element if you could be able to articulate that.

JULES

42’04 - So, I mean, our position is that the current trade dogma within the EU is overdated, is outdated, that we haven't really woken up to the reality that we're sitting alone at the WTO table. And so we're calling for some introduction of these types of EU preference ideas, but also just reinforcing the existing arsenal that we have to make sure that some of the investments that companies make are secured. You've seen in the news, again, we're in early September. In the last few weeks and months, we've had a couple of occurrences, one with wind energy in Germany, where a project recently scrapped their purchase of Chinese wind turbines. And another incident a few months ago where it appeared that inverters, solar inverters, had been, that Chinese solar inverters had some hidden communications devices within them. In any case, two kind of events of more in the security realm, but that start to show some of the trade offs of, you know, cost versus security. And as you say, cost versus keeping some of that added value within Europe, right? which especially in the automotive sector, we know the battery is a huge share of that value added. So one idea, and I'd love to hear your thoughts on this, is can we start to – are there easier partnerships and easier collaborations that we can start with, with, I don't know, South Korea, with Japan on some of these technologies, or does it have to be China?

LAURENCE TUBIANA

43’38 - I think we have to have as many, like, you know, as many of emerging countries want to work with everybody just for that reason. You should not be dependent from one. So if we can go with South Korea and Japan, better. Then to invest together with Chinese knowledge in a way we can control the information element that is embedded in. I didn't know this solar inverter story. I don't know what the communication they wanted to use for, well, what the information collect. But anyway, that's typically the thing. You don't invest if we – so that basically we have to make choices. I know that for the European Commission, for example, is very worried about – and the security people – about the number of electric cars from China because of the transfer of information that will happen because of this. So that's why I think we should be, that's why I was coming back to our previous discussion. You know there is a frenzy for we want to connected cars, that everybody, well, that's an advertisement and we have to be better at that. But you see, people begin to be worried about that, and we should build on that. Why do you want cars that are disconnected with so many things that control you? So autonomy could be a very strong argument. for selling new cars that are not that connected. I'm sure you have that experience. Now, when you rent a car, you never know what the car will do because it will decide. Even the trivial one you can find in any agency of car renting. So people are not just happy and have that conversation now regularly. Why this car has decided to slow down or even to break when I haven't decided this? I think we should, again, that culture and tech. I think that probably is a space where we could, you know.

JULES

45’40 - Human autonomy versus autonomous cars.

LAURENCE TUBIANA

Human autonomy is something that is fundamentally the base of our democracies. Agency, where are the agency if I cannot control my car? And that the car decided for me. I think it's a very strong thing. And it could, we develop car without this. And why we not find a market for that? I think now people have tried. So you have publics that have tried. I don't think they are so happy with this. So we could try.

JULES

46’07 - That's right. Maybe to finish up, if you try to project a few years ahead, what is your vision? What's your ideal vision for a successful European clean industry?

LAURENCE TUBIANA

46’20 - So I see major shifts we have to anticipate because every industry will not be developing in every country the same because, of course, of the resource base, in particular if we want to go to support the energy consumption by renewable energy, so not all countries have equipped the same. And I don't think of who the solution is to have. We will have better grids, that's for sure, but that doesn't mean. The second element is how we integrate security with clean tech. So you have all the terrible response, no, to the Russian invasion to say how the tech will go for the drones and whatever to the defense and security. Can we, because of that, which is a sovereignty and security dimension, can we push for… We have a clean tech that has dual benefits? I'm sure that some people are thinking about that. And we're trying to really say, what are the clean tech for the peace? We need to think ahead. And that, I think in the future, that could be good. Again, agency of people, autonomous societies, developing the clean tech that allow people to control more of their lives. That, I think, would be a very interesting future because it's based on a different political model. And I think what we see is like authoritarian regime are striving for the moment. They need control. And we should oppose that. We have the clean tech of the democracy.

JULES

48’15 - Thank you very much, Laurence. Let's leave it here. We've now reached the end of this episode. I really want to thank you so much for making the time to be with us today and for a great conversation. Three things I take away from it. One, we have a lot to learn from the spirit of Paris and looking forward to the next COP to hear more. Two is how policymakers have a real duty to lead and to chart a path forward. And they haven't been doing that lately. And three is how we can build a smarter trade strategy and a smarter kind of global strategy around some of these tradeoffs. Thank you so much, Laurence.

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CONCLUSION

JULES

48’45 - Thank you all for tuning in to Time to Scale, the podcast by Cleantech for Europe. If you enjoyed this episode, please subscribe, rate and review it. share it with a friend, or feel free to send us any feedback and questions. We'll put the links to Laurence's social media in the episode and hope to see you soon.

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